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THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
 A Critical Evaluation 
 




The regional African human rights system is based on the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African or Banjul 
Charter),1 which entered into force on October 21, 1986, upon 
ratification by a simple majority of member states of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU).2  In June 1998, the OAU 
adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples' Rights.3  The African Human Rights Court is intended to 
complement4 the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
                     
     *Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo 
Law School; Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY Buffalo; Chair, 
Kenya Human Rights Commission; S.J.D., (1987), Harvard Law 
School; L.L.M., (1985), Harvard Law School; L.L.M., (1984), 
University of Dar-es-salaam; L.L.B., (1983), University of Dar-
es-salaam.  
     1The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 
59 (1982). 
     2The African Charter was adopted in 1981 by the 18th Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, the official body of 
African states.  It is also known as the Banjul Charter because a 
final draft of it was produced in Banjul, the capital of the 
Gambia. 
     3Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
Organization of African Unity, Ougadougou, Burkina Faso, June 
1998, OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.(1) Rev.2. [hereinafter Protocol]. 
  See also “African Foreign Ministers Discuss Human Rights,” 
Africa News, April 15, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
CURNWS File.  
     4The Protocol shall enter into force thirty days after 
ratification by fifteen OAU member states.  Protocol, supra note 
3, article 34.  Although by April 1999 the Protocol had been 
signed by 30 states, only two, Burkina Faso and Senegal, had 
ratified it.  See “African Human Rights Commission Session 
Opens,” Africa News, April 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, News 
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the body that has exercised continental oversight over human rights 
since 1987.5  The Protocol suggests that the African Human Rights 
Court will make the promotion and the protection of human rights 
within the regional system more effective.6  But the mere addition 
of a court, although a significant development, is unlikely by 
itself to address sufficiently the normative and structural 
weaknesses that have plagued the African human rights system since 
its inception.  
 
The modern African state is in many respects the  colonial in 
a different guise.  The African state has been such an egregious 
human rights violator that skepticism about its ability to create 
an effective regional human rights system is appropriate.7  
                                                                  
Library, CURNWS File.  The Protocol states in the preamble that 
the African Human Rights Court shall "complement and reinforce 
the functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights."  See preamble, Protocol, supra note 3.  Elsewhere, the 
Protocol clarifies and emphasizes that the African Human Rights 
Court shall "complement the protective mandate of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights."  Id., article 2.  See 
also Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos Magliveras, “Reinforcing the 
African System of Human Rights: The Protocol for the 
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights,” 
16 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 431 (1998); U. Oji Umozurike, “The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 92-3 (1997). 
     5Until the Protocol comes into force and a Human Rights 
Court is established, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights [hereafter African Commission] will remain the 
sole supervisory organ for the implementation of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.   
     6See generally preamble, Protocol, supra note 3. 
     7For discussions and analyses of the colonial imprint on the 
African post-colonial state, see Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and 
Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(1996); Crawford Young, "The Heritage of Colonialism," in Africa 
in World Politics 19 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothschild, eds., 
1991); Robert H. Jackson, "Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan 
Africa," 46 J. Int'l Aff. 1 (1992); Ali A. Mazrui, "The African 
State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Collapse and Human 
Displacement," Int'l J. Refugee L., Special Issue, July 1995, at 
21; Makau wa Mutua, "Why Redraw the Map of Africa: a Moral and 
Legal Inquiry," 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1113 (1995).  Discussing 
Africa's colonial legacy, one author notes that the "[m]ost 
obvious and powerful expressions of the continued African 
conceptual reliance on European political forms are the African 
 
 3 
Although the Banjul Charter makes a significant contribution to the 
human rights corpus, it creates an ineffectual enforcement system. 
 Its most notable contributions are the codification of the three 
"generations" of rights, including the innovative concept of 
peoples' rights, and the imposition of duties on individuals.8  But 
many commentators have focused on the weaknesses in the African 
system.  These include the "clawback" clauses in the African 
Charter, the potential abuse of the language of duties, and the 
absence of an effective protection mandate for the African 
Commission.9 
 
Recent changes in the African state, particularly those 
related to demands for more open political societies, may augur 
well for the protection of civil and political rights.10  Emergent 
democracies such as Namibia, Malawi, Benin, South Africa, Tanzania, 
and Mali are more inclined than their predecessors to respect human 
rights at home, and to agree to a more viable regional system.  In 
this context, the African Human Rights Court is likely to operate 
                                                                  
states themselves.  The states are direct and uncritical 
successors of the colonies."  See Art Hansen, "African Refugees: 
Defining and Defending Human Rights," in Human Rights and 
Governance in Africa 139, 161 (Ronald Cohen, Goran Hyden, & 
Winston Nagan, eds., 1993). 
     8On duties on the individual, see arts. 27-29, African 
Charter, supra note 1.  For a discussion of the concept of duties 
in human rights discourse and the African Charter, see Makau wa 
Mutua, "The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: 
an Evaluation of the Language of Duties," 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 339 
(1995). 
     9For discussions of these problems, see Richard Gittleman, 
"The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: a Legal 
Analysis," 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 667 (1982); Richard Gittleman, "The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and 
Procedures," in Guide to International Human Rights Practice 153 
(Hurst Hannum, ed., 1984); Cees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah, "The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights," in Guide to 
International Human Rights Practice 159 (Hurst Hannum, ed., 
1992).  
     10See Makau wa Mutua, "African Renaissance," New York Times, 
May 11, 1991 (describing the demands by Africans for political 
democracy); Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 
1993 (1992), at 6-9 (reporting Africa's political upheavals, 




in a less hostile or cynical environment, the climate that 
determined and sharply limited the powers and effectiveness of the 
African Commission.  In addition, the 1994 Rwandese genocide and 
the recent atrocities in Nigeria, Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Republic of the Congo, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo have further illuminated the need 
for stronger domestic and regional guarantees for human rights.  In 
fact, at no time in recent African history have the conditions for 
the creation of an effective regional human rights system been more 
favorable. 
 
This paper critically evaluates the African human rights 
system and assesses its potential impact on human rights conditions 
on the continent.  It examines the normative aspects and 
institutional arrangements created under the African Charter and 
the Protocol for the African Human Rights Court.  It asks whether  
a clear and mutually reinforcing division of labor between the 
African Commission and the African Human Rights Court could be 
developed to more effectively promote and protect human rights on 
the continent.  Should, for example, the mandate of the African 
Commission be limited primarily to promotional activities, and the 
African Human Rights Court exclusively given the protective 
function?  What relationship should the court have to the African 
Commission?   
 
In sum, the paper explores the effect of the African human 
rights system in three principal areas.  First, it examines the 
normative, conceptual, and historical aspects of the African 
Charter and its contribution to the human rights corpus.  Second, 
it looks at the work of the African Commission in the development 
of the law of the African Charter, including the problems that it 
has faced. Third, it addresses the norms and structure governing 
the African Human Rights Court and its potential to fill the 
lacunae left by the African Commission and alleviate some of its 
weaknesses.  The paper also looks at the roles of civil society and 
the media in the processes of political reform and democratization, 
as these are intrinsically linked to the promotion and protection 
of human rights in Africa.  Finally, it discusses ways in which the 
African human rights system can penetrate the legal and political 
cultures of African states to inspire, encourage, and ensure the 
internalization of human rights. 
 
II. The African Charter: A Diagnosis 
 
The African Charter is not an accident of history.  Its 
creation by the OAU came at a time of increased scrutiny of states 
for their human rights practices, and the ascendancy of human 
rights as a legitimate subject of international discourse.  For 
African states, the rhetoric of human rights had a special 
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resonance for several reasons.  First, post-colonial African states 
were born out of the anti-colonial human rights struggle, a fight 
for political and economic self-determination.  Second, black-ruled 
African states deployed human rights arguments to demonize and 
delegitimize the colonial and minority white-ruled states of 
Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and Apartheid 
South Africa.  Finally, the atrocities of some of the most brutal 
dictatorships the African continent has ever known heightened the 
urgency for a regional human rights system.  The abominations of 
Idi Amin of Uganda, Bokassa of the Central African Empire, and 
Nguema of Equitorial Guinea came to be viewed internationally as 
paradigmatic of African leadership.  As this author has pointed out 
elsewhere: 
 
The [African] leadership had to reclaim international 
legitimacy and salvage its image.  In 1979, shaken by these 
perceptions, the OAU Summit in Monrovia, Liberia, appointed a 
committee of experts to prepare a draft of an African human 
rights charter.  It was ironic that virtually none of the men, 
the Heads of State and Government, were freely and fairly 
elected.  Without exception, they presided over highly 
repressive states.  It was virtually the same club of 
dictators who adopted the African Charter in Nairobi, Kenya in 
1981. Thus was born the African human rights system.11 
 
Normatively, the African Charter is an innovative human rights 
document.  It substantially departs from the narrow formulations of 
other regional and universal human rights instruments.  It consists 
of 68 articles and is divided into four chapters: Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; Duties; Procedure of the Commission; and 
Applicable Principles.12  It weaves a tapestry which includes the 
three “generations” of rights: civil and political rights; 
economic, social, and cultural rights; and group and peoples’ 
rights.  Its most controversial provisions impose duties on 
individual members of African societies.  The Charter links the 
concepts of human rights, peoples’ rights, and duties on 
individuals.   
 
The problems of the African human rights system, which thus 
far has been anchored in the African Commission, are well 
documented.13  These include the normative weaknesses in the African 
                     
     11See Makau wa Mutua, "The African Human Rights System in a 
Comparative Perspective," 3 Rev. Afr. Comm. Hum. & Peoples' Rts. 
5, 7 (1993). 
     12See generally African Charter, supra note 1. 
     13For analyses of some normative and structural problems of 
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Charter and the general impotence of its implementing body, the 
African Commission.  But the distinctive contributions of the 
African Charter to the human rights corpus, which include the 
concept of duty and the inclusion of the "three generations" of 
rights in one instrument, have also been articulated and applauded 
by some scholars.14 
 
Perhaps the most serious flaw in the African Charter concerns 
its “clawback” clauses. These clauses permeate the African Charter 
and permit African states to restrict basic human rights to the 
maximum extent allowed by domestic law.15  This is especially 
significant because most domestic laws in Africa date from the 
colonial period and are therefore highly repressive and draconian. 
 The post-colonial state, like its predecessor, impermissibly 
restricts most civil and political rights, particularly those 
pertaining to political participation, free expression, association 
and assembly, movement, and conscience.  Ironically, it is these 
same rights that the African Charter further erodes. 
 
"Clawback" clauses, that is, qualifications or 
limitations, permeate the provisions [of the African 
Charter] dealing with fundamental freedoms.... These 
fundamental civil and political rights are severely 
limited by clauses like "except for reasons and 
conditions previously laid down by law," "subject to law 
and order," "within the law," "abides by the law," "in 
                                                                  
the African human rights system, see Richard Gittleman, "The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis," 
22 Va. J. Int'l L. 667 (1982); Cees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah, 
"The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights," in Guide to 
International Human Rights Practice 159 (Hurst Hannum, ed., 
1992); Olosula Ojo & Amadu Sessay, "The OAU and Human Rights: 
Prospects for the 1980s and Beyond," 8 Hum. Rts. Q. 89 (1994); 
Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights: Practice and Procedures (1996).  
     14Makau wa Mutua, "The Banjul Charter and the African 
Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties," 
35 Va. J. Int'l. L. 339 (1995); B. Obinna Okere, "The Protection 
of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and 
American Systems," 6 Hum. Rts. Q. 141 (1984); Josiah Cobbah, 
"African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African 
Perspective," 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 309 (1987). 
     15See Mutua, "The African System in a Comparative 
Perspective," supra note 11, at 7. 
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accordance with the provisions of the law," and other 
restrictions justified for the "protection of national 
security."16   
 
                     
     16Id., at 7. 
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The African Charter does not have a general derogation clause. 
This omission is all the more serious because the Charter in effect 
permits states through the "clawback" clauses to suspend, de facto, 
many fundamental rights in their municipal laws.17  In any event, 
nothing in the Charter prevents African states from denying certain 
rights during national "emergencies."18  A revision of the Charter 
should excise the offending "clawback" clauses, insert a provision 
on non-derogable rights, and another specifying which rights states 
can derogate from, when, and under what conditions.        
 
Another controversial question in the Charter concerns its 
language of duties.  The African Charter takes the view that 
individual rights cannot make sense in a social and political 
vacuum, unless they are coupled with duties on individuals.  In 
other words, the Charter argues that the individual egoist is not 
the center of the moral universe.  Thus it seeks to balance the 
rights of the individual with those of the community and political 
society through the imposition of duties on the individual.  The 
Charter contemplates two types of duties: duties that individuals 
owe to other individuals, to the community, and the state, on the 
one hand, and duties that the state bears to its subjects, on the 
other.   
 
Individuals owe duties to the “family and society, the State 
and other legally recognized communities.”19  Furthermore, each 
individual has a “duty to respect and consider his fellow beings 
without discrimination.”20  Significantly, every individual has a 
duty to “preserve the harmonious development of the family and to 
work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his 
parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need.”21 Among 
other matters, these provisions raise questions about the 
commitment of the African Charter to women’s rights.  There is a 
perception and fear that either the African Charter does not 
adequately protect or could be used to abuse women's rights.22   The 
                     
     17Arthur E. Anthony, "Beyond the Paper Tiger: the Challenge 
of a Human Rights Court in Africa," 32 Tex. Int'l L. J. 511, 518 
(1997). 
     18See Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights 233-34 
(1995). 
     19Art. 27(1), African Charter, supra note 1. 
     20Id., art. 28. 
     21Id., art. 29(1). 
     22For discussions of the Charter's view on women, see Claude 
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"family" provisions have been thought to condone and support 
repressive and retrogressive structures and practices of social and 
political ordering.23  This language, which places duties on the 
state and individuals to the family, has been interpreted as 
entrenching oppressive family structures which marginalize and  
 
exclude women from participation in most spheres outside the home. 
others feel that it supports the discriminatory treatment of women 
on the basis of gender in marriage, property ownership and 
inheritance, and imposes on them unconscionable labor and 
reproductive burdens.   
 
In my view, these fears are exaggerated because a progressive 
and liberal construction of the Charter seems to leave no room for 
the discriminatory treatment of women. The Charter could be read 
differently.  It can be argued that these are not the practices 
that the Charter condones when it requires states to assist 
families as the "custodians of morals and traditional values."  
Such an interpretation would be a cynical misreading of the 
Charter.  One interpretation is that the reference here is to those 
traditional values which enhanced the dignity of the individual and 
emphasized the dignity of motherhood and the importance of the 
female as the central link in the reproductive chain.  In many 
societies across pre-colonial Africa, women were highly valued as 
                                                                  
E. Welch, Jr., "Human Rights and African Women: a Comparison of 
Protection under Two Major Treaties," 15 Hum. Rts. Q. 548 (1993); 
Florence Butegwa, "Using the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights to Secure Women's Access to Land in Africa," in 
Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 
495 (Rebecca Cook, ed., 1994); Chaloka Beyani, "Towards a More 
Effective Guarantee of Women's Rights in the African Human Rights 
System," in Human Rights of Women: National and International 
Perspectives 285 (Rebecca Cook, ed., 1994; Joe Oloka-Onyango, 
"The Plight of the Larger Half: Human Rights, Gender Violence and 
the Legal Status of Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in 
Africa," 24 Denver J. Int'l L. & Pol. 349, 371-74 (1996). 
     23Article 18, African Charter, supra note 1, refers to the 
family as the "natural unit and basis of society" and requires  
the state to "assist the family which is the custodian of morals 
and traditional values recognized by the community."  Elsewhere, 
the Charter provides that the individual owes "duties towards his 
family and society."  Id., art. 27(1).  Further, that every 
individual has the duty to "preserve the harmonious development 
of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the 
family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in 
case of need."  Id., art. 29(1). 
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equals in the process of the regeneration of life.24 
 
The Charter's veneration of African culture has also been 
construed as reinforcing gender oppression.  The charge here is 
that the Charter sees itself as the savior of an African culture is 
permanent, static, and unchanging.  Viewed this way, the Charter 
would freeze in time and protect from reform, radical change, or 
repudiation those cultural norms, practices, and institutions which 
are harmful to women.  Again, taken in its totality as a human 
rights document, the Charter does not support such a backward 
reading.  The Charter seems to guarantee, unambiguously and without 
equivocation, the equal rights of women in its gender and equality 
provision by requiring states to "eliminate every discrimination"25 
against women and to protect women's rights in international human 
rights instruments.   
 
                     
     24See Mutua, "The African Cultural Fingerprint," supra note 
14, at 371-72. 
     25Id., at 372.  The Charter states that the "state shall 
ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and 
also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the 
child as stipulated in international declarations and 
conventions."  Art. 18(3), African Charter, supra note 1.  Among 
the international conventions applicable here would include the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 
14 (CEDAW).  Normatively, CEDAW is perceived as a very 
progressive and forward-looking document. 
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Read in conjunction with other provisions, the Charter seems 
to leave no room for discriminatory treatment against women.  To 
allay these fears, however, and to prevent a conservative human 
rights court from ever giving the Charter a discriminatory 
interpretation in gender matters, the African Charter should be 
supplemented by an optional protocol to fully address women's 
rights issues in all their complexity and multiple dimensions.26  
 
                     
     26There already have been calls for a protocol on women's 
rights.  See Rachel Murray, "Report of the 1996 Sessions of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights," 18 Hum. Rts. L. 
16, 19 (1997). 
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The more general critique sees the language of duties as 
“little more than the formulation, entrenchment, and legitimation 
of state rights and privileges against individuals and peoples”27  
These critics of the language of duties, however, only point to a  
theoretical danger that states might capitalize on the duty concept 
to violate fundamental rights.28  The fear is frequently expressed 
that emphasis on duties may lead to the “trumping” of individual 
rights, if the two come into conflict.29 In my view, these 
criticisms, while understandable, are mistaken.  African states 
have not notoriously violated human rights because of their 
adherence to the concept of duty.  The disastrous human rights 
performance of many African states has been triggered by insecure 
regimes whose narrow political classes have no sense of national 
interest and will stop at nothing, including murder, to retain 
power.  In any case, it is not a plausible argument that 
individuals should not owe any duties to the state.  In fact, they 
do, in tax, criminal, and other laws.  A valid criticism of the 
language of duties should rather focus on the precise meaning, 
content, conditions of compliance, and application of those duties. 
 More work should be done to clarify the status of the duties in 
the Charter, and define their moral and legal dimensions and 
implications for enforcement.  
 
III.  The African Commission: Ambiguity and Anemia 
 
The African human rights system is anchored by the African 
Charter and implemented by the African Commission. The Commission 
is vested largely with promotional functions and an ambiguous 
protective function.  Thus far the system lacks a credible 
enforcement mechanism.  This is hardly surprising because virtually 
no African state, with the exceptions of the Gambia, Senegal, and 
Botswana could even boast of a nominal democracy in 1981, the year 
that the OAU adopted the African Charter.30  Hopes by observers of 
the African Commission that it would robustly construe the Charter 
to alleviate its weaknesses have largely gone unrealized.  With 
                     
     27H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, “Human and Peoples’ Rights: What 
Point is Africa Trying to Make?,” in Human Rights and Governance, 
supra note 7, at 74, 78-79. 
     28Id., at 79. 
     29Ronald Cohen, “Endless Teardrops: Prolegomena to the Study 
of Human Rights in Africa,” in Human Rights and Governance, supra 
note 7, 3, at 15. 
     30Mutua, “The African Human Rights System in a Comparative 
Perspective,” supra note 11, at 7. 
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respect to specific functions, and to its performance in general, 
the African commission has been a disappointment.  This section 
discusses the architecture of the African Commission and outlines 
its basic strengths and weaknesses. 
 
The African Commission was established in 1987, the year after 
the African Charter entered into force.31 The eleven members of the 
African Commission, the commissioners, are elected by secret ballot 
by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government from a list 
nominated by states parties to the African Charter.32  The 
commissioners, who serve in their personal capacity,33 are elected 
for a six-year term and are eligible for re-election.34 Only by the 
unanimous agreement of all other commissioners can a member of the 
Commission be removed from office, for failure of performance.35 
 
                     
     31Art. 30, African Charter, supra note 1. 
     32Id., art. 33. 
     33Id., art. 31(2). 
     34Id., art. 36. 
     35Id., art. 39(2). 
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The basic functions of the African Commission are both 
promotional and protective.36  The promotional function, which the 
Charter emphasizes, includes research and dissemination of 
information through workshops and symposia, the encouragement of 
national and local human rights institutions, the formulation of 
principles to address legal problems in human rights, and 
cooperation with African and international human rights 
institutions.37  The Commission is empowered to interpret the 
Charter at the request of a state party, the OAU, or any 
organization recognized by the OAU.38  In contrast, the provision 
relating to the protective function is quite terse.  It provides, 
without elaborating, only that the Commission shall "[e]nsure the 
protection of human and peoples' rights" in the Charter.39  
 
                     
     36Id., art. 45, which sets out the functions of the African 
Commission. 
     37Id., art. 45(1). 
     38Id., art. 45(3).  This role, which allows the Commission 
to interpret the Charter, is potentially one of the areas that 
the commissioners could seize upon to expound and clarify the 
Charter.   
     39Id., art. 45(2). 
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More concretely, the African Charter charges the Commission 
with three principal functions: examining state reports,40 
considering communications alleging violations,41 and expounding the 
African Charter.42  These functions follow the general script of 
other regional as well as universal human rights bodies.43  In 
particular, the Commission seems to have drawn substantially from 
the procedures and experiences of the UN Human Rights Committee.44  
Its Rules of Procedure,45 which provide for process before the 
Commission, and the Reporting Guidelines,46 which specify the form 
and content of state reports, mirror the lessons of other human 
rights bodies.  The Guidelines were supplemented by General 
Directives, an unpublished document that was sent to foreign 
ministers of states parties in 1990.47  The Directives are just a 
                     
     40States parties must submit, every two years, a report on 
the legislative and other measures taken to give effect to rights 
in the African Charter.  Id., art. 62. 
     41Id., arts. 47 and 55.  The Charter permits two types of 
communications: from individuals, NGOs, and groups, on the one 
hand, and inter-state communications, on the other.  The latter 
has never been invoked and will not concern this Article. 
     42Id., art. 45(3). 
     43See Philip Alston, "Appraising the Human Rights Regime," 
in The United Nations and Human Rights: a Critical Appraisal 1 
(Philip Alston, ed., 1992); See generally Thomas Buergenthal, 
International Human Rights, supra note 18, at 21-247 (describing 
UN Charter-based and treaty-based human rights instruments and 
bodies, as well the African Inter-American, European human rights 
systems). 
     44The Human Rights Committee is the treaty body that 
oversees the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
     45The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights, adopted on October 6, 1995, reproduced in 18 
Hum. Rts. L. J. 154-163 (1997) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].  
     46See "Guidelines for National Periodic Reports," Second 
Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, Annex III, June 1989, AFR/COM/HPR.5(VI). 
     47See Astrid Danielsen, The State Reporting Procedure Under 
the African Commission 51-2 (1994) [hereinafter State Reporting 
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precis of the Guidelines. 
 
                                                                  
Procedure]; Evelyn A. Ankumah, The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights: Practice and Procedures 82-3 (1996) 
[hereinafter Practice and Procedures of African Commission]. 
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The Commission's primary protective function, that of 
considering complaints filed by individual victims as well as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs),48 has a large potential which 
thus far has not been realized.  First, the Charter places no 
restriction as to who may file a communication, an opening that 
allows any individual, groups, or NGOs, whether or not they are the 
direct victims of the violation complained of, to lodge a 
petition.49  However, communications can only be considered by the 
Commission if they: indicate their authors, even if the authors 
wish to remain anonymous to the public; are not written in a 
language that is insulating or disparaging to the state or the OAU; 
are not incompatible with the OAU Charter and the African Charter; 
are not be based exclusively on media reports; are sent after the 
petitioner exhausts local remedies, unless these are obviously 
unduly prolonged; are submitted within a reasonable time after 
local remedies are exhausted; do not deal with a matter that has 
been settled by the states concerned in accordance with 
international instruments.50 
 
 Although the Charter does not explicitly require it, 
communications are considered in private or closed sessions.51  If 
the Commission determines that one or more communications "relate 
to special cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious 
or massive violations"52 of human rights, it must draw the attention 
of the OAU to such a situation and, presumably, conduct an on-site 
                     
     48The African Charter requires that the Commission 
"cooperate" with African and international NGOs in its work.  
Art. 45(1)(a) and (c), African Charter, supra note 1.  Thus the 
Commission grants human rights NGOs observer status which allows 
their representatives to participate in the public sessions of 
the Commission.  Rule 75, Rules of Procedure, supra note 45. 
     49Art. 55, African Charter, supra note 1. 
     50Id., art. 56. 
     51Rule 106, Rules of Procedure, supra note 45.  The 
Commission, which makes its own rules of procedure, may justify 
closed sessions for communications under article 59 of the 
Charter which provides, in part, that "all measures taken within 
the provisions of the present Charter shall remain confidential" 
until the OAU decides otherwise.  But this provision is overbroad 
and vague.  A literal interpretation of "all measures" would be 
absurd.  Perhaps the Commission could open at least part, if not 
all, of the communications processes to the public. 
     52Art. 58(1), African Charter, supra note 1. 
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investigation.  In the case of an emergency, the Commission must 
inform the Chair of the OAU and request an in-depth study, which 
most likely calls for on-site fact-finding.53  This provision had 
remained a dead letter until 1995 when the Commission, with the 
assistance of the OAU Secretary General, secured the agreement of 
Senegal and Togo for field investigations.54  The Commission's power 
to conduct such investigations is clearly authorized by the Charter 
which empowers it to "resort to any appropriate method of 
investigation."55  The commissioners, however, had been reluctant 
until recently to claim these powers.  
 
The Commission's formula for considering individual 
communications closely mirrors that of the UN Human Rights 
Committee.  In a format similar to that of the HRC, the Commission 
arranges its decisions into sections dealing with facts, argument, 
admissibility, merits of the case, and the finding.  Each of these 
sections is scant and thin in both substance and reasoning.  Two 
examples will suffice.  In Constitutional Rights Project v. 
Nigeria,56 a petition challenging a death penalty that was imposed 
in violation of due process protections, for example, the 
Commission adopted its scripted presentation, "declared" a 
violation of the Charter provisions, and "recommended" that Nigeria 
free the petitioners.57  In another petition, Civil Liberties 
Organization v. Nigeria,58 the Commission found that the government 
enacted laws, in violation of the African Charter, to abridge due 
process rights and undermine the independence of the judiciary.  It 
is fair to say, however, that the communications procedure has come 
                     
     53Id., art. 58(3). 
     54“Final Communique of the 17th Ordinary Session of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,” March 12-22, 
1995, Lome, Togo, available in 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/achpr17f.html>; see also, 
Ankumah, Practice and Procedures of the African Commission, at 
47. 
     55Art. 46, African Charter, supra note 1. 
     56Communication 60/91, "Decisions and Reports: African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights," 18 Hum. Rts. L. J. 28 
(1997). 
     57Id. 
     58Communication 129/94, "Decisions and Reports: African 




a long way since the early days.  A predictable tradition of 
considering petitions is slowly evolving.   
 
It is also clear, however, that the decisions referred to 
here, and others before them, are formulaic, and do not reference 
jurisprudence from national and international tribunals or fire the 
imagination.  They are non-binding and attract little, if any, 
attention from governments and the human rights community.  The 
decisions cannot be published without permission from the OAU 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government.59   As explained by two 
human rights advocates, the African Commission has revised its 
earlier strict interpretation of article 59 which prohibited the 
publication of communications: 
 
This changed with the Seventh Activity Report of the 
Commission, adopted by the Assembly in June 1994.  For 
the first time, this report made available information on 
the first fifty-two communications decided by the 
Commission.  The information disclosed includes a summary 
of the parties to the communication, the factual 
background, and the Commission's summary decision.  With 
the adoption of the Commission's Eighth and Ninth Annual 
Activity Reports, the Commission went a step further and 
issued full texts of its final decisions.60 
 
The publication of the Commission's decisions takes place only 
after they have been submitted to the OAU Assembly.61  Although the 
procedure appears quasi-judicial, the Commission sees its principal 
objective as creating a dialogue between the parties, leading to 
the amicable settlement of the dispute in question.62  In any case, 
                     
     59The Charter provides that all "measures taken within the 
provisions of the present Charter shall remain confidential until 
such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
shall decide otherwise."  See Art. 59(1), African Charter, supra 
note 1.     
     60See Chidi Anselm Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, "The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: the Development 
of its Non-state Communications Procedures," 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 235, 
277 (1998) [hereinafter "Development of Non-state 
Communications"]. 
     61Id. 
     62Communications 16/88, 17/88, 18/88 Comite Culturel pour la 
Democratie au Benin, Hilaire Badjogoume, El Hadj Boubacare 
Diawara v. Benin (it notes, inter alia, that "it is the primary 
objective of the Commission in the communications procedure to 
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neither the Charter nor the Commission provide for enforceable 
remedies or a mechanism for encouraging and tracking state 
compliance with decisions.  To many victims, the Commission's 
findings are too remote if not virtually meaningless.63  This 
overall picture, which is a gloomy one, is by no means universally 
shared.  Some see in the communications procedure the gradual 
evolution of an effective mechanism:  
 
A comparison of the decisions over the years shows that 
while room remains for considerable improvement, the 
quality of the Commission's reasoning and decision making 
has continued to evolve positively.  In the past two 
years, the decisions of the Commission have been more 
substantive and elaborate on the issues of law and fact 
that are raised in and considered in communications.64 
 
State reporting, which is required by the Charter, follows the 
pattern of other human rights bodies.65  The Charter tersely 
provides that states shall submit every two years, a "report on the 
legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to 
the rights and freedoms" enumerated in it.66  The Charter does not 
say to what body the reports are to be submitted, whether, how, and 
with what goal the reports should be evaluated, and what action 
should be taken after such evaluation.  The Commission, not 
surprisingly, has filled in these gaps by borrowing heavily from 
other treaty bodies.67  Unfortunately, it has mimicked both the good 
                                                                  
initiate a dialogue between the parties which will result in an 
amicable settlement to the satisfaction of both and which 
remedies the prejudice complained of").  See Odinkalu and 
Christensen, "The Development of Non-state Communications," supra 
note 60, footnote 51, at 244. 
     63See African Society of International and Comparative Law, 
Report of the 16th Session of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights 62-83 (1996) for more communications by the 
Commission.  For a very thoughtful analysis of the communications 
procedure before the African Commission, see Odinkalu & 
Christensen, "The Development of Non-state Communications," supra 
note 60. 
     64Odinkalu & Christensen, "The Development of Non-state 
Communications," supra note 60 at 278. 
     65Art. 62, African Charter, supra note 1. 
     66Id. 
     67See Felice D. Gaer, "First Fruits: Reporting By States 
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and the bad in those bodies. 
 
The Reporting Guidelines, which are detailed, are supposed to 
guide states in the preparation of their reports.  In particular, 
the Guidelines specify both the form and content of reports.  Thus 
reports must describe in detail the legislative regime as well as 
the actual application and protection of specific human rights.  In 
reality, however, many of the reports submitted thus far have been 
woefully inadequate on both counts.68  The initial report of Ghana, 
for example, was only a scant five pages while that of Egypt, 
although a voluminous fifty pages, only described abstractly some 
legislation without commentary on the state of human rights 
conditions on the ground.69  
 
Reports are examined in public and state representatives and 
the commissioners engage in "constructive dialogue," whose purpose 
is to assist and encourage states implement the Charter.  After 
considering a report, the Commission communicates its comments and 
general observations to the state in question.70  Although the 
Charter came into force in 1987, the majority of states parties 
have not submitted their reports, and the Commission has been 
powerless to force compliance.71  The reporting process seems to 
have yielded very little so far, as many of the state 
representatives have appeared either incompetent or ill-prepared.72 
 States do not seem to take the reporting seriously and so far the 
comments and observations of the Commission on state reports have 
not had any discernable effect on states. 
 
But the African Commission has taken some steps which have the 
potential to increase its impact on states.  In 1996, the 
                                                                  
Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights," 10 
Netherlands Hum. Rts. Q. 29 (1992), for an evaluation of the 
initial state reporting under the African Charter. 
     68See generally, Ankumah, Practice and Procedures of African 
Commission, supra note 47, at 79-110. 
     69Id., at 91-2. 
     70Rule 106, Rules of Procedure, supra note 45. 
     71Mohamed Komeja, "The African System of Human and Peoples' 
Rights: an Annotated Bibliography," 3 East Afr. J. of Peace & 
Hum. Rts. 271, 284-85 (1996). 
     72Ankumah, Practice and Procedures of the African 
Commission, supra note 47, at 99. 
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Commission appointed one its members as a Special Rapporteur on 
Summary and Extra-judicial Executions is potentially significant if 
the office is used to investigate, report, and dialogue with 
states.73  Additionally, its country-specific and thematic 
resolutions raise its visibility and engage states directly.  Such 
resolutions have, for example, called on Sudan to allow detainees 
access to lawyers and doctors and asked the government to support 
negotiations for the settlement of the conflict with the south.74  
Another resolution urges African states to respect the rights of 
prisoners and to ratify the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment.75 These resolutions have 
received little publicity and there are no indications that states 
 take them seriously. However small and tentative, these are steps 
in the right direction.   
 
IV.  The African Human Rights Court: Fears and Hopes 
 
                     
     73Rachel Murray, "Report of the 1996 Sessions of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights," 18 Hum. Rts. L. J. 16 
(1997), supra note 26. 
     74See Report of the 16 Session of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 63, at 89-90. 
     75Id., at 95. 
Both the European and the inter-American human rights systems 
give the impression that a human rights court is an essential, if 
an indispensable component of an effective regime for the 
protection of human rights.  The reasoning here is that norms 
prescribing state conduct are not meaningful unless they are 
anchored in functioning and effective institutions.  In the case of 
the African regional system, this truism merits special attention 
because both the norms in the African Charter and the African 
Commission itself have been regarded as weak and ineffectual.  
Hence the push for a human rights court, an institution that is 





There have been two polar views on the creation of an African 
human rights court.  One view holds that a human rights court must 
be established as soon as possible to salvage the entire system 
from its near-total irrelevance and obscurity.76  According to this 
view, the deficiencies of the African system -- both normative and 
institutional -- are so crippling that only an effective human 
rights court can jump-start the process of its redemption.  The 
court is here seen as a proxy for putting some teeth and bite in 
the system.  The state is the target that must be restrained.   
 
The other view is gradualist and sees the work of the African 
system as primarily promotional and not adjudicative.  According to 
it, the major problem in Africa is the lack of awareness by the 
general populace of its rights and the processes for vindicating 
those rights.  Proponents argue that the regional system must 
therefore first educate the public by promoting human rights.  The 
task of protection, which would include a human rights court, is 
seen here as less urgent.77  Critics argue that a court might be 
paralyzed by the same problems that have beset the African 
Commission.  They therefore urge that the African Commission be 
strengthened instead of dissipating scarce resources to create 
another, possibly impotent institution.78 
 
                     
     76See Mutua, "The African System in a Comparative 
Perspective," supra note 11, at 10; Komeja, "The African System 
of Human and Peoples' Rights': an Annotated Bibliography," supra 
note 71, at 287. 
     77See Ankumah, Practice and Procedures of the African 
Commission, supra note 47, at 194-95. 
     78Id., at 195. 
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From the mid-to-late 1990s, the gradualist view gave way to 
the proponents of a human rights court largely due to the lobbying 
efforts of African NGOs and human rights academics.  It had become 
clear by the mid-1990s, even to pro-establishment figures, that the 
African system was a disappointment, if not an embarrassment for 
the continent.  In 1994, the conservative OAU Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government asked its Secretary General to call a meeting 
of government experts to "ponder in conjunction with the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights over the means to enhance 
the efficiency of the Commission in considering particularly the 
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights."79   
 
Events moved speedily in the next several years.  In September 
1995, a draft document on an African human rights court was 
produced by a meeting of experts organized in Cape Town, South 
Africa, by the OAU Secretariat in collaboration with the African 
Commission and the International Commission of Jurists.80  Later 
that month, an OAU meeting of governmental legal experts produced 
the Cape Town Draft of the draft protocol for a human rights 
court.81  After several rounds of meetings and more drafts, the 
Draft Protocol was adopted by the conference of OAU Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys General in December 1997.  The OAU Council of 
Ministers adopted the Draft Protocol in February 199882 and the OAU 
Assembly gave its final blessing in June 1998,83 opening the 
Protocol for signature by OAU member states. 
                     
     79See Report of Government Experts Meeting, AHG/Res 
230(xxx), 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government, Tunis, Tunisia, June 1994, cited in Ibrahim Ali 
Badawi El-Sheikh, "Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights: Introductory Note," 9 Afr. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 943, 944 (1997) [hereinafter Draft Protocol to the 
African Charter]. 
     80Id., at 944. 
     81See "Report of Government Experts Meeting on the 
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights," 
September 6-12, 1995, Cape Town, South Africa, 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT(1)Rev.1.  Id. 
     82See "International Conference on Human Rights Commission 
Opens in Addis," XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 18, 1998, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
     83See "Pursuit for Peace Remains Major Task for Africa: 
Salim," XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 18, 1998, available in LEXIS, 




The consensus among government officials, NGOs, and academics 
on the need for a human rights court in the African regional system 
has steadily gained momentum.  This realization is indicative of 
the shortcomings that currently plague the African system.  While 
the push for the court is not a repudiation of the African 
Commission, it is an acknowledgment of its general ineffectiveness. 
 The hope appears to be that a court will strengthen the regional 
system and realize its promise.  But that will not happen unless 
the court avoids the pitfalls that have trapped the African 
Commission. 
 
The presence of other regional human rights courts in the 
Americas and Europe has given impetus to the African initiative and 
advanced the idea within the modern African state that its conduct 
towards its own citizens is no longer an internal, domestic matter. 
 Even in Asia, where states have been more resistant to the 
application and internalization of the human rights corpus -- and 
where as of yet there is no regional human rights system -- that 
resistance is bound to come under increasing attack by NGOs due to 
the establishment of a human rights court in Africa.  The regional 
supervision of a state's internal conduct towards its nationals is 
quickly becoming a reality. 
 
There is little doubt that both the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have given the 
idea of international enforcement concreteness in a way that did 
not seem plausible a mere fifty years ago.  Africa, a continent 
that has been plagued by serious human rights violations since 
colonial rule, is now poised to further erode the power of the 
sovereign with the establishment of an adjudicatory body, the 
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.84  At the adoption of 
the Draft Protocol in December 1997, Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU 
Secretary General, stated that human rights "is a basic requirement 
in any society and a pre-requisite for human progress and 
development."85  
 
                     
     84Id. 
     85"Talks Open in Addis Ababa on Establishing African Human 
Rights Court," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 12, 1997, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
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The African Human Rights Court is an attempt to address some 
of the weaknesses of the African system. Its basic function is 
protective, and seeks to complement the work of the African 
Commission, whose work is basically promotional.86  Although the 
African Commission's mandate includes state reporting87 and the 
consideration of communications88, a function which is protective, 
it is the promotional activities which have been the centerpiece of 
its operations.89  But commentators agree that both the state 
reporting and the communications procedures have been 
disappointing, partly due to the lack of powers and the absence of 




The court would be composed of eleven judges elected in their 
individual capacity by the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and 
Government from among "jurists of high moral character and of 
recognized practical, judicial or academic competence and 
experience in the field of human and peoples' rights."90  Judges 
would serve for a six-year term and be eligible for re-election 
only once.91  It is a shortcoming that all judges, except the 
                     
     86The Protocol realizes this contrast -- in essence the 
weaknesses and the incompleteness of the African Commission -- 
when its states in its preamble that the African Human Rights 
Court will "complement and reinforce the functions of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights."  Protocol, preamble, 
supra note 3.  It adds, further, that the African Human Rights 
Court shall "complement the protective mandate of the African 
Commission."  Id., Article 2. 
     87Article 62, African Charter, supra note 1. 
     88These include state-to-state and "other" communications, 
which could come from individuals, groups, and organizations.  
Id., articles 55, 56. 
     89The principal activities of the African Charter, which are 
promotional, are to collect documents, undertake studies, 
organize seminars, disseminate information, encourage national 
and local institutions concerned with human rights, formulate 
principles to resolve human rights problems, and interpret the 
African Charter.  See Id., article 45. 
     90Art. 11(1), Protocol, supra note 3. 
     91Id., art.15 (1). 
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President of the court, serve on a part-time basis.92  Although 
their independence is formally guaranteed and they are protected by 
the immunities of diplomats under international law, part-time 
service undermines the integrity and independence of the court.93  A 
Judge can only be removed by the unanimous decision of all the 
other judges of the court.94  A Judge who is a national of a state 
party to a case must be recused to avoid bias.95 The court appoints 
its own registrar and registry staff.96 
 
The court's jurisdiction is not circumscribed or limited to 
cases or disputes that arise out of the African Charter.97  The 
Protocol provides that actions could be brought before it on the 
basis of any instrument, including international human rights 
treaties, which are ratified by the state party in question.98  
Furthermore, the court can apply as sources of law any relevant 
human rights instrument ratified by the state, in addition to the 
African Charter.99  The court is empowered to decide if it has 
jurisdiction in the event of a dispute.100  The court can exercise 
both contentious and conciliatory jurisdiction.101  It has advisory 
jurisdiction through which it may issue advisory opinions on "any 
legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human 
rights instruments."102  Such an opinion can be requested by a wide 
variety of entities including a member state of the OAU, the OAU or 
any of its organs, or even an African NGO, provided it is 
                     
     92Id., art.15(4). 
     93Id., art.17. 
     94Id., art.19. 
     95Id., art.22. 
     96Id., art.24. 
     97Id., art.3(1) 
     98Id. 
     99Id., art. 7. 
     100Id., art.3(2). 
     101Id., art. 9, which allows the court to attempt the 
"amicable settlement" of disputes. 
     102Id., art.4(1). 
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recognized by the OAU.103 
 
One serious shortcoming of the African Human Rights Court 
relates to the limitation of access placed by the Protocol on 
individuals and NGOs.  The court has two types of access, one 
automatic, the other optional.  The African Commission, states 
parties, and African intergovernmental organizations enjoy 
unfettered or "automatic" access to the court once a state ratifies 
the Protocol.104  In stark contrast, however, individuals and NGOs 
cannot bring a suit against a state unless two conditions are met. 
 First, the court has discretion to grant or deny such access.105  
Secondly, at the time of ratification of the Draft Protocol or 
thereafter the state must have made a declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the court to hear such cases.106   
 
While this limitation may have been necessary to get states on 
board,107 it is nevertheless disappointing and a terrible blow to 
the standing and reputation of the court in the eyes of most 
Africans.  After all, it is individuals and NGOs, and not the 
African Commission, regional intergovernmental organizations, or 
states parties, who would be the primary beneficiaries and users of 
the court.  The court is not an institution for the protection of 
the rights of states or OAU organs.  A human rights court is 
primarily a forum for protecting citizens against the state and 
other governmental agencies.  This limitation will render the court 
virtually meaningless unless it is interpreted broadly and 
liberally. 
 
The court is technically independent of the African Commission 
although it may request the Commission's opinion with respect to 
                     
     103Id. 
     104Id., art.5(1), 5(2). 
     105Id., art. 5(3) provides that the "court may entitle 
relevant Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with observer 
status before the [African] Commission, and individuals to 
institute cases directly before it..." (emphasis added) 
     106Id., at 5(3), 34(6). 
     107Ambassador Badawi, a member of the African Commission and 
its former chair, alludes to this when he notes that the 
"question of allowing NGOs and individuals to submit cases to the 
court was one of the most complicated issues during the 
consideration of the Draft Protocol."  See Badawi El-Sheikh, 
"Draft Protocol of the African Charter," supra note 79. 
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the admissibility of a case brought by an individual or an NGO.108  
In ruling on admissibility of a case, the court must also take into 
account the requirements that communications must meet under the 
African Charter.109  Presumably, the court should not hear cases 
which do not meet these criteria.  The court may also consider 
cases or transfer them to the African Commission, where it feels 
that the matter requires an amicable settlement, not adversarial 
adjudication.110 
 
It is vital that the court determines its own rules of 
procedure111, a fact which should enhance its independence.  
Proceedings before the court would generally be conducted in public 
and parties would be entitled to legal representation of their own 
choice.112  Witnesses or parties to a case "shall enjoy all 
protection and facilities, in accordance with international law"113 
in connection with their appearance before the court.  This would 
shield witnesses from various pressures and intimidation and 
facilitate their ability to more fully and freely participate in 
proceedings.   
 
The court is given wide powers in conducting proceedings.  It 
seems to have discretionary jurisdiction, and need not take all the 
cases that come before it.  This should allow the court to avoid 
over-load and to hear only those cases which have the potential to 
advance human rights protection in a meaningful way.  The court may 
hear submissions from all parties, including oral, written, and 
expert testimony.114  States are required to assist the court, and 
provide facilities for the efficient handling of cases.115  Once the 
                     
     108Art. 6(1), Protocol, supra note 3. 
     109Id., art. 6(2).  See art. 56, African Charter, supra note 
1, for a list of the requirements that communications before the 
African Commission must meet. 
     110Art. 6(3), Protocol, supra note 3. 
     111Id., art.33. 
     112Id., article 10(1), (2).  Free legal representation may 
also be provided where the "interests of justice so require."  
Id., article 10(2). 
     113Id., art.10(3). 
     114Id., art.26. 
     115Id., art.26(1). 
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court finds a violation, it may order remedies, including "fair 
compensation or reparation."116  In cases of "extreme gravity and 
urgency," the court may order provisional remedies, such as an 
injunction, to avoid irreparable harm to victims, actual or 
potential.117   
 
The court's judgments, which are final and without appeal,118 
are binding on states.119  In its annual report to the OAU, the 
court specifically lists states which have not complied with its 
judgements.120  This is a "shaming" tactic that marks the violator. 
 The OAU Council of Ministers is required to monitor the execution 
of the judgement on behalf of the OAU Assembly.  Presumably the OAU 
Assembly can take additional measures to force compliance, such as 
passing resolutions urging states to respect the court's 
judgements.  Alternatively, the OAU Chairman could be empowered to 
write to delinquent states asking that they honor the court's 
judgements. 
 
                     
     116Id., art.27(1). 
     117Id., art.27(2). 
     118Id., art.28. 
     119Id., art.30 provides, in part, that states "undertake to 
comply with the judgement in any case in which they are parties 
within the time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its 
execution."  (emphasis added). 
     120Id., article 31. 
Critics and supporters alike have argued that it makes little 
sense to create an institution that duplicates the weaknesses of 
the African Commission.  In the context of the OAU, an organization 
with scarce financial resources and limited moral clarity and 
vision, the establishment of a new body should be approached 
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somberly.  A human rights court will only be useful if it genuinely 
seeks to correct the shortcomings of the African system and 
provides victims of human rights violations with a real and 
accessible forum to vindicate their basic rights.  What the OAU and 
the African regional system do not need is yet another remote and 
opaque bureaucracy, one that promises little and delivers nothing. 
 If that were the case, then it would make more sense to expend 
additional resources and energy to address the problems of the 
African Commission and defer the establishment of a court for 
another day.  Several important questions will have to addressed if 
the human rights court is to become a significant player in human 
rights in Africa. 
 
The second set of problems that face the human rights court 
are institutional.  These concerns are external to the court and 
are compounded by matters internal to it, such as the tenure of 
judges and its effect on the independence of the court and the 
limitation of access to the court to individuals and NGOs.  It is 
absolutely critical that the court is, and be perceived as, 
separate and independent from the African Commission to avoid 
burdening it with the severe image problems and the anemia 
associated with its older sibling.  This is possible if there is a 
clear-cut division of labor between the African Human Rights Court 
and the African Commission.  That is not currently the case.  A 
court was not contemplated by the drafters of the African Charter 
and as a result the African Commission was vested with both 
promotional and protective functions.  One clear protective 
function is the individual complaint procedure which makes the 
Commission "court-like" because of its quasi-judicial character.   
 
The African Charter should be revised to remove protective 
functions from the African Commission and to vest them exclusively 
with the African Human Rights Court.  The African Commission should 
only be charged with promotional functions, the most basic of which 
should be state reporting and dialogue with NGOs and government 
institutions in member states to encourage promotion, advocacy, and 
the incorporation of human rights norms into state policies and 
domestic legislation.121  This unambiguous demarcation of areas of 
competence should alleviate the problem of hierarchy or 
"competition" between the two institutions, and may enhance 
cooperation and mutual reinforcement.  Importantly, it should avoid 
tainting one body with the baggage of the other.  Thus the African 
Commission would clearly be the "political" body while the court 
                     
     121At a recent meeting, NGOs and members of the African 
Commission started a dialogue on possible amendments and 
revisions to the African Charter.  These included women's rights, 
"clawback" clauses, and derogation of rights.  Id., at 19. 
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would alone be the judicial or "legal" organ of the African human 
rights system. 
 
The court has broad powers and may, presumably at its 
discretion, exercise contentious, conciliatory, or advisory 
jurisdiction.  The Protocol does not seem to impose a mandatory 
jurisdiction on the court, that is, require it to hear every 
admissible case.  While certain entities are entitled to submit 
cases to it, the court has discretion under the admissibility 
clause to consider or transfer cases to the African Commission.122  
This discretion is essential if one considers the purposes of 
adjudication that the court ought to carve out for itself to become 
effective, relevant, and visible in the struggle against the 
culture of impunity and human rights violations. 
 
There are three basic purposes which are associated with 
national and international adjudicatory bodies.  These are: 
vindicating the rule of law by providing justice in an individual 
case; protecting rights through deterrence and behavior 
modification; and expounding legal instruments and making law 
through elucidation and interpretation.123  To fulfill its promise, 
the African Human Rights Court will have to reflect carefully on 
these roles and decide where it has the potential to make a 
meaningful contribution. 
 
The African Human Rights Court should not be viewed as a forum 
for offering individual justice to victims of human rights 
violations.  While such a goal is certainly noble, it is by all 
means impossible.  The court can act neither as a forum of first 
instance nor as the mandatory court of appeal for all cases.  Cast 
in this role, the court would be paralyzed by a torrential 
caseload.  Statistics from other fora tell why the court should not 
burdened with a mandatory jurisdiction.  The most poignant example 
is that of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body that oversees 
the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.124  Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 
                     
     122Art. 6(3), Protocol, supra note 3. 
     123See Henry J. Steiner, "Individual Claims in a World of 
Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights Committee?," 
in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Philip Alston 
& J. Crawford, eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 
1999) (see text at the beginning of section entitled "Purposes of 
Adjudication"). 
     124See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1996) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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individuals can petition the HRC for the vindication of their 
rights.125  The HRC's use of a mandatory jurisdiction to consider 
all admissible cases has created a back-log of at least three 
years.126  The possible ratification of the Optional Protocol by 
states with large populations such as China, India, USA, and 
Indonesia -- together with the growing familiarity by victims with 
the procedure -- can only underscore the complete inability of the 
HRC to respond to all individual cases. 
 
The African Human Rights Court need not make the mistake of 
the HRC.  It will not survive if it adopts a mandatory jurisdiction 
because the volume of cases is bound to be enormous.  Instead the 
court should only hear those cases that have the potential to 
expound on the African Charter and make law that would guide 
African states in developing legal and political cultures that 
respect human rights.  In other words, the court should not be 
concerned with individual cases where it looks, as it were, 
backwards, attempting to correct or punish an historical wrong to 
an individual.  Rather, the court should look forward and create a 
body of law with precedential value and an interpretation of the 
substantive law of the African Charter and other key universal 
human rights documents to direct states.  Here, the court would 
protect rights by judgements which by their nature deter states 
from future misconduct by modifying their behavior.  Individual 
justice would be a coincidence in the few cases the court would 
hear.  Moreover, individual courts in OAU member states should look 
to the African Human Rights Court for direction in the development 
and application of human rights law. 
 
                     
     125See Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), 
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
     126For statistics on the twenty years since the HRC 
communications procedure became effective under the Optional 
Protocol, see 1997 Report of the Human Rights Committee, GAOR 
Supp. No. 40 (A/52/40), Section VII(A). 
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Finally, the African Human Rights Court would benefit 
tremendously from the experiences of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as well 
national fora such as the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
which have taken the lead in developing human rights jurisprudence. 
 The court should closely examine the factors that have made these 
institutions more effective.  Some authors have identified a 
checklist of such factors which the African Human Rights Court 
ought to contemplate.127  Helfer and Slaughter have organized them 
into three clusters: factors that states parties to the treaty 
creating the court control (such as tribunal's composition, its 
investigative powers, and the legal status of its decisions); 
factors that the tribunal itself controls (such as quality of legal 
reasoning and degrees of autonomy from political interests); and 
factors beyond the control of the tribunal and the states parties 
(such as the cultural identities of states and the nature of abuses 
monitored by the tribunals).128  
 
This checklist can be particularly useful if judges are 
independent and motivated by the drive to make the African Human 
Rights Court the central institution in the development of a legal 
culture based on the rule of law.  Over the past decade, there has 
been a general movement in Africa towards more accountable and open 
governments.  The court comes in an environment of increased 
awareness about the proper limits of governmental conduct.  For the 
first time since decolonization, states seem to be more willing to 
either foster or allow the creation of institutions of public 
accountability.  The checklist by Helfer and Slaughter would appear 
to be a useful one under these circumstances, considering that the 
three clusters make a reasonable template for an emergent regional 
court.  Ultimately, effective supranational adjudication will not 
be possible in Africa unless the OAU system and individual member 
states treat, and expect, the African Human Rights Court to lead  
them in transforming the dismal legacy of state despotism on the 
continent. 
 
5: Civil Society, Human Rights, and Political Reform 
                     
     127See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
"Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication," 107 
Yale L. J. 273 (1997). 




The establishment of the regional human rights system in 
Africa in the mid-to-late 1980s coincided with the onset of what 
has been termed African Renaissance.129  After the first three 
decades of independence had failed primarily because of bad 
government, African peoples across the continent were determined in 
the late 1980s to end years of despotic, unaccountable, single 
party or military governance.  After all, many economic and social 
indicators had dipped to an all-time low.  It was in this climate 
that Africa started witnessing historic demands for political 
liberalization since decolonization some three decades earlier.  
Throughout the continent, millions of citizens started to demand a 
government sanctioned by the free will of the governed.  This 
“second African liberation” sought to reverse decades of 
authoritarian one-party rule, unspeakable human rights abuses, and 
economic mismanagement.  A determined cadre of middle-class 
moderates, mostly notably lawyers, journalists,130 and human rights 
advocates were relentlessly pressing governments throughout Africa 
to open up the political process to a competitive electoral 
process.  The rallying cry for these reformers was, and remains, 
human rights and its inseparable twin, the rule of law.  
 
These continental convulsions started in 1989 in Cotonou, 
Benin, then a centrally planned, autocratic one-party state. Almost 
in tandem with anti-communist reformers in Eastern/Central Europe, 
hundreds of citizens took to the streets of Cotonou demanding that 
long-standing dictator Mathieu Kerekou resign immediately and hand 
over power to an elected government.  At first, Kerekou responded 
to the protests by ordering the beatings and arrests of the 
demonstrators.  He relented, however, as the number of mass 
protests mounted.  Within months, President Kerekou was forced to 
agree to a national constitutional conference with his political 
opponents, civic leaders, and religious groups.  In March 1991, he 
was resoundingly defeated in the country’s first democratic 
election since independence in 1960. The newly elected, democratic 
government of Nicephore Soglo won international acclaim for its 
impressive stewardship of the emergent democracy.  The new 
government restored judicial independence and the freedom of the 
press.  For the first in the country’s history, the legislature and 
 civic and local organizations became vehicles for popular 
                     
     129Makau wa Mutua, “African Renaissance,” New York Times, May 
11, 1991, at L23. 
     130For reports on the emergent African free press and its 
struggles with the state, see Committee to Protect Journalists, 




Since the turn toward democracy, more respect for human 
rights, and a free press in Benin, many African governments have 
agreed to open political competition, some after protracted 
national debates and false starts and fits.  But typically, 
virtually all one-party or military regimes in Africa have been 
forced over the past decade to agree to new constitutional 
frameworks that guarantee open political competition and 
fundamental human rights.  In 1994 apartheid in South Africa was 
defeated in no small measure to the relentless campaigns of the 
internal civil society and political groups working in concert with 
the international community.  In May 1994, Kamuzu Banda 
relinquished power in Malawi after the first open election in the 
country’s history.132  This story has been replayed in most states 
in Africa. In effect, political reformers have uprooted one 
dictator after another. Today only a few states in Africa formally 
reject political democracy as a system of government. 
The apparent spontaneity and unpredictability of the 
democratic upheaval throughout Africa shocked policy analysts, 
particularly in the West, where it has been believed for a long 
time that Africa was not ready for political democracy.  But to 
most Africans the events of the last decade were long overdue.  
Over the years, attempts by Africans to overthrow repressive 
regimes have been quickly reversed or fallen short.  But a number 
of factors have combined to produce the beginnings of encouraging, 
albeit limited successes.  The basic impetus for the change has 
been the inability of the African state to meet the basic economic 
needs of the population.  At independence, Africans expected their 
governments to reduce widespread poverty, ignorance, and disease.  
But the very nature of the new regimes militated against sustained 
development.  Carved haphazardly by European powers, most of them 
did not cohere as states or make sense as political and economic 
entities. The export-oriented, one-product economies imposed by 
colonial overlords did not create an auspicious setting for 
developmental take-off.  The global marketplace, with its throw-
away prices for primary commodities, would not be kind to these new 
                     
     131It was ironic, but a measure of the progress brought about 
by popular participation, that in 1996 Kerekou became the 
beneficiary of the democratic rules of engagement that he has 
sought to suppress six years earlier.  In 1996, he was returned 
to power after defeating Nicephore Soglo, the man who had 
defeated him in 1991 in the country’s first democratic election 
since independence.  See “Voodoo Day Called Ploy to Get Votes,” 
Phoenix Gazette, January 11, 1996, at A2. 
     132Makau wa Mutua, “Forgive, But Don’t Forget,” Boston Globe, 





These problems were significantly compounded by the political 
and moral bankruptcy of the new elites of politicians and 
bureaucrats.  They inherited and maintained, almost intact, the 
repressive and exploitative colonial structures.  They faithfully 
carried out ill-advised economic programs and projects of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  They consumed 
conspicuously the national resources.  To maintain their 
stranglehold on power, they depleted the balance of resources, 
including international assistance, to equip security forces.  
Dissent and independent political activity were brutally suppressed 
 by persecution of opponents, real and perceived.  Under these 
regimes, most indices of well-being plummeted sharply, giving rise 
to universal discontent among the citizenry.  These desperate 
conditions led to coups and counter-coups, civil wars, and other 
social and economic catastrophes.  With the end of the cold war, 
and the inability or the unwillingness of the United States and the 
former Soviet Union to prop up their client states, these miserable 
conditions left many governments exposed and without external 
support.  Hence, the success of the pro-democracy reformers. 
 
Not surprisingly, African reformers from Benin in 1989 to 
Nigeria in 1999 have based their campaigns to capture state power 
on civil and political rights, the language of liberalism.  They 
argue that it is from these freedoms that a democratic ethos and a 
culture of tolerance will emerge. Human rights groups, women’s 
groups, environmentalists, bar associations, private electronic and 
print media, and farmer’s lobby groups have mushroomed throughout 
Africa in the past decade. Political parties have become one of the 
principal avenues for mediating state power. Yet human rights 
problems abound everywhere on the continent.  Despite the 
establishment of the regional human rights system and the creation 
of national human rights institutions in places as diverse as 
Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda to mention a few, the continent 
remains a euphemism for human suffering. In the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, 
the Republic of Congo, and Angola, human rights conditions remain 
bleak and grim. There have been painful reversals in some states, 
such as Burundi and the Republic of Congo where democratic gains 
were made earlier in the decade.  Elsewhere, the deepening and 
consolidation of democracy is becoming a serious challenge.  One 
thing is clear: the emergent paper-thin democracies of Africa will 
fail or revert to dictatorship unless a confluence of domestic and 
international factors combine to lift these societies over the 
threshold.   
 
Emergent democracies must create constitutional and legal 
regimes that permit the growth of a vibrant and open civil society 
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with a democratic ethos, respect for opposing views, and a free 
press.  They must allow the whole gamut of civil and political 
rights.  Formally, this can be effected at once.  Repressive laws, 
undemocratic constitutional and state structures, and suffocating 
government regulations can be repealed at once upon the ascendancy 
of popularly elected legislatures.  But that alone will not 
suffice.  Due to centuries of abuse and deprivation, it has been 
difficult, and in many cases impossible, to develop and sustain 
practices that enhance and internalize concepts of civic 
responsibility, an essential ingredient in a functioning democracy. 
 Emergent democracies must allow the growth of the private, non-
governmental sector and instill in public servants and law 
enforcement officials an appreciation for the proper limits of 
state action.  They must also contain and punish, without 
exception, the unconstitutional and corrupt practices of state 
officials.  In this respect, the anti-corruption and reform efforts 
of Olusegun Obasanjo, the democratically elected president of 
Nigeria, will be instructive and telling about the future of 
democracy in Africa.133 
 
                     
     133Norimitsu Onishi, “Nigerian Leader Amazes Many With Strong 
Anti-Graft Drive,” New York Times, November 23, 1999, at A1. 
The most serious threat to democracy, civil society, and 
reform remains, however, in the impoverished economies of African 
states.  Democracy will not take root in Africa if the majority of 
its population continue to live in abject poverty.  Africans 
support democracy because they expect it to reverse decades of 
corruption, mismanagement, and economic hardship. Only innovative 
domestic economic policies coupled with a reform of the 
international economic arrangements to take into account the 
difficult conditions of African states can create the conditions 




Africa has been traumatized by human rights violations of 
historic proportions over the last five centuries.  The recent 
chapter in that long history of abuses is still being authored 
under the direction of the post-colonial state.  But the peoples of 
Africa, like peoples elsewhere, have never stopped struggling for 
better conditions of life, and especially for more enlightened and 
accountable political societies.  The popular repudiation of one- 
party and undemocratic states over the past decade has once again 
given hope that the predatory impulses of the post-colonial state 
might be arrested.  Within states, non-governmental organizations 
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have multiplied during that period and governments are being been 
forced to revise policies and laws that are offensive to basic 
human rights.  At the continental level, NGOs and human rights 
advocates have demanded that the African Commission become part of 
this movement towards change. 
 
This is the lense through which Africans now view the African 
human rights system.  While it is felt by many Africans that the 
idea of the African Commission was a step in the direction, there 
are serious misgivings that it has been largely ineffectual.  
Further, that a regional human rights system worth its name need 
strong institutions to anchor its norms.  The African Human Rights 
Court is an attempt to fulfill that promise.  However, the court 
promises to be a disappointment unless states parties revisit the 
African Charter and strengthen many of its substantive provisions. 
 Moreover, the court will not meet the expectations of Africans if 
the OAU does not provide it with material and moral support to 
allow it to function as the independent and significant institution 
that it ought to be.  Finally, of course, the initial integrity and 
vitality of the court will rest with those who will be privileged 
to serve as its first bench.  Unless these conditions are met, the 
African Human Rights Court is condemned to remain a two-legged 
stool, a lame institution unable to fulfill its promise as a seat 
from which human rights can be advanced.  In that case, the court 
will have failed to redeem the troubled African regional system. 
